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Title:
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Greece: The Colonels' Puritan Revolution.

APPR OVED BY M"EIVraERS OF

~he

~~--Jitte~IS

COt"lrJjITTEE :

purpose of this paper is to examine the present

political situation in Greece and the events that took
~lace

from the time that

Papandreo~'s

Center Gnion ?brty

carne to power in 1964 to the military coup
however, in order to 6evelop a picture of

d'e~at

WIled,

in 1967.

led to the

cOup of 1967, it is necessary not only to discuss specific
e~/ents

-!?rior and during the cou-p. but also to present a

brief background of modern Greek politics since Greece's
independence from the Turks in 1821.
~he

paper is divided into five chapters:

the first

chapter briefly summarizes the events that took place on

April 21, 1967; the second traces the events thLt led
to the April 21 coup d'etat; the third indicates what
the situation was before hpril 21, 1967; the fourth
discusses the policies 6nd governing methods of the
present military regime; the fifth is a concluding
statement.
There is little data in books or professional
journals about recent Greek politics.

Oonsequently,

this work was largely dependent on newspapers, news
magazines, and the testimony of a number of Greeks
for information.
The Greek people are presently under the
dictatorial rule of a military regime.

Resistance

against the regime appears to be increasing.

AS

resistance increases, more repressive measures and
unrest will develop, until the country erupts into
a bloody civil war.
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CHAPTER I
IwrRODUCTION

At 2:30 on the morning of the 21st of April 1967,
the Greek army carried out a coup d'etat and replaced
the civilian democratic rule of Greece with a military
dictatorship.
The coup d'etat was initiated with the sudden
arrest of political leaders and the take over of
communications media and police districts in all major
cities of Greece with armored vehicles manned with battleready soldiers.
The coup came so suddenly and the movement of those
carrying it out

w~s

so smooth that no one even suspected

that a coup had been contemplated.
Eight soldiers with machine guns and rifles with
fixed bayonets broke into the hOilie of Andreas P8pandreou,
son of the Prime Minister and a representative in the
Greek Parliament, and dragged everyone out of bed, shouting
"Where is Andreas ll •

Andreas and his family thought at

first that the house had been invaded by terrorists to
assasinate them.
Similar situations were repeated throughout the
country, as the military junta was determined to eliminate

i I
, I

2

all of its political opposition, by arresting and jailing
most of the national and community political leadership
of Greece.
Known supporters of the Papandreou regime were
arrested immediately.

Confidential sources l in the

service of the military junta indicate that some of the
most able career officers were either retired or were
arrested and jailed without any regard to their rank,
professional expertise, or service record.

Career civil

servants were also replaced immediately by relatives and
trusted friends of the regime.

Labor unions were dissolved

by military order and then re-established, with their new
membership made up of junta-approved people.

Voluntary,

professional, and civil organizations were reorganized
along the same lines, and their leadership was hand-picked
by the military governor of each military district.
The civilian leadership of small communities, such
as the village presidents, was replaced by appointed
military officers.
Reorganization in Greece was complete.

Most of the

civilian and political leadership was replaced by military
officers and their supporters at the lowest level, in the
smallest village and smallest organization.
lA number of Greek sources must remain confidential
out of fear of reprisals by the regime.

CHAPTER II
WHAT LED TO THE COUP D'ETAT
The story of the present military dictatorship goes
back to December 1966, when George Papandreou resigned
as Prime Minister of Greece.

The resignation came as

a result of the struggle between King Oonstantine and
Papandreou over the question of whether Papandreou had the
power to fire one of his minj.sters without the King I s approval.
Following Papandreou's resignation, King Oonstantine
appointed a caretaker government and promised that elections
would be forthcoming in May of 1967.
King Oonstantine promised that elections would be
held even though it was not likely that he would allow
nB~ionBl

elections to take place as long as the Center

Union Party· was slJrong. 'l'he leaders of the Oenter Union,
George and Andreas Papandreou (the King's bitte.c enemies),
were very popular with the Greek people, and the King was
fearful that a national election as promised would be
turned into a national plebiscite against the royal family.
*Note: Greek political Parties with abbreviations
were as follows:
Political Parties
Center Union Party (CUP)
Liberal Democratic Center (FIDIK)
National Radical Union (ERE)
Progressive Party (KP)
United Democratic Left (EDA)

Political Spectrum
Center
Center Right
Right
Right
Left

4

At this point (in order to attraQt attention away
from the issue of the promised elections), the persecution
of Andreas Papandreou began, and in December of 1966,
-(ihe Athens prosecuting attorney charged Andreas with high
treason and asked that his immunity as a member of the
Pa~liament

be lifted.

Andreas was accused of being the

ring-leader of a leftist faction composed of young officers
in the Greek armed forces; of intending to overthrow the
Monarchy by force, and of wishing to establish a socialistic
government in Greece.

Although ERE, one of the major

political parties, supported this move, smaller political
parties, as well as the CUP, the dominant party, opposed it.
During the months preceding the coup, there was
heated parliamentary maneuvering and double-dealing
between the political parties and the King.

On March, 30, 1907, the CUP sponsored legislation
(protecting deputies of Parliament from arrest during the
election period) intended to provoke a parliamentary crisis
and bring about the resignation of the caretaKer government.

j

This move was successful, and on april 3, the King,

i

bypassing the CUP, appointed Panayiotis Kanelopoulos, the

I'

leader of the ERE, as the new head of government.
Because the CUP had a majority in the parliament and
the new government evidently could not receive a vote of
confidence, the King told Kanelopoulos to disolve

I
I'
I
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Parliament. 2

Kanelopoulos was told hy the King to continue

as the head of a service government and prepare for
elections within forty-five days, as required by the 1952
contitution.
During this period Andreas Papandreou would no
longer be a deputy, but a candidate for re-electiun.

His

immunity as a member of Parliament would be removed, and
he would be subject to arrest.

As indicated above, be had

already been charged with high treason.
Andreas's arrest was expected to provoke large scale
demonstrations in the major cities of Greece and,
consequently, to give the King Bnd his supporters an excuse
to

~ostpone

the May elections.

It had become apparent that the CUP would win
over-whelmingly in free elections and that the royal
family and its supporters would be in trouble politically.
Upon dissolution of Parliament, Kanelopoulos evidently
came to an understanding with George Papandreou that
~ndreas

would not be arrested.

Apparently Kanelopoulos

did not play the game as was planned by the King and

~he

Army.

As the agreement between the leaders of the two
major parties became evident, the Army Colone1s 5 struck
on April 21, aG 2:30 in the morning; Kanelopoulos was
2Jtephen Rousseas, The Death of a Demo~r~cy-Greece
and the American Conscience (New YOr~k-~:~~G"'r--o-v-e~P~r~e-s~s·--I~D~!~c-., 1967)
p.

61.

3The agreement obviously was only a pretext. The
efficiency of the coup indicates extensive planning.

I
.I
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arrested along with other Greek political leaders.
When The Coup Was Carried Out
Moments after midnight on April 21, soldiers in
battle dress, began to appear in every key city and town
and at every major street and intersection allover Greece.
Radio stations, airports, railroads and all communication
and transportation media were seized by the Army.
Greece's borders were closed, and its communications
with the outside \'Jorld stopped. No planes could land
or take off, and arriving ships were turned away
from ports. Suddenly, a land of 8,)50,000 people,
roughly the size of the state of New York, found
itself totally cut off from the rest of a puzzled
world, in the first mililary takeover in Free
Europe since the 1930's.
The leaders of the coup invoked the royal name in
every action they took.

They sought to give legitimacy

to their actions by fostering the impression that they
were in the name of his Highness the King.
The leaders moved quickly, indiscriminately arresting
all political leaders regardless of party, as indicated
by the following:5
In Athens' Kolonaki district, three soldiers
and a captain called at: 2 a.m. upon Premier
Panayotis Kanelopoulos, who had heard of trouble
and barricaded his door. The officer explained
4uGreece", Time, (April 28, 1967), p. 28.
5Ibid.

7
that they had come Lo protect him. ~ need
no protection ll , cried Kanelopoulos, "I am
Premier of Greece ll • The soldiers broke
down the door. "vJhy don't you kill me here? II ,
the Premier asked. The soldiers hustled
him swiftly into an army truck and drove him
off to a detention center.
In his suburban home at Kastri, a political
foe of Kanelopoulos, former premier George
Papandreou, was dragged out of bed and
marched off without even being given time to
put on his shoes; he had to carry them
along. His leftist son Andreas, sleeping some
miles away was a particular target of the
military; they sent eight soldiers and a
captain to fetch him. They overpowered his
bodyguard, smashed a glass door while breaKing
into the house, and dragged Andreas off in
his underpants, his feet bleeding from the
glass.
The scene was much the S8me allover Athens.
By 3:00 a.m., practicvlly all of Greece's leading
politicians,of almost every persuasion and
leaning, had been rounded up and herded into
detention centers in downtown Athens. The
military suspended key clauses of the constitution,
banned strikes and all public gatherings, im90sed
censorship on the press, closed schools, banks
and stores, did away with the need for search
warrants and set up special military courts to
try violators.
Although King Constantine attempted to persuade
his army friends to reverse the course of events, he was
unsuccessful.

He finally went along with the junta.
It was reported that: 6
The Putschists rounded up over five thousand
persons in three categories--suspects, potentially
dangerous and known enemies--in those two hours
(allowing themselves a one hundred per cent margin
of error in::.;,,,, numerical estimate).
6George Bailey, liThe Puritan Revolt in Greece ll ,
The Reporter, (May 18, 1967), p. 19.

8

During its first one hundred days the military
dictatorship took steps to insure its stay in power
through terrorism of the Greek people by mbrtial law,
by

setting down rules of what the people

~ould

do and

could not do, and by determining what books they could
read and how they shOuld dress.

Some of the steps

tak~n

during this period by the junta to reform the moral

chara~ter of the Greeks are-indicated as follows:?
Special ~iLitary courts-martial have been set
up allover the country to punish Greeks who
offended against King, Church or Jun~a. In
At~ens 8 worke~ w~s se~~enced t? one ~ear in
prlson for "benavlng llke a 'reddy boy , a
tradesman to six months for "disobedience to
authorities" . Ivlikis Theodora"Kis, the noted
leftist musician, who composed the score for
the film "L.orba the Greek", last week vJas
sentenced in absentia to 5~ months in prison
for offending the honor of the royal family.
An estimated 150 to 200 Greeks are already
behind bars on such charges, and more are
arrested each week.
The junta also seeks to reform Greece by
issuirig an almost endless of do's and don'ts.
A few outlandish decrees, such as the ban on
beards, were prudently withdrawn, but others
have stuck. The junta has blacklisted the
works of nearly 300 Greek and scor~s of foreign
authors, some Red, but others simply liberal,
such as Senator J.W. Fulbright. They have
stripped Actress Melina Mercouri and some
400 other Greeks abroad of their citizenship,
because they have "lost their Greek soul and
conscience". rrlhey have banned who's who in
Greece; •.• A decree forbidding five or more
persons to as~emble without prior police
permission has all but killed Athen's social
life.
7 tlGreec e: the li'irst 100 Day s ", Time, (Augu st 4, 1967),
p. 29-30.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -......----""""-1'11':
IIi
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As soon as the three leaders (Pattakos, Papadopoulos
and l"iakarezos) of the junta \vere sworn into office by the
Primate of Greece, they appointed Constantine Kollias
as Premier.

He was the sole civilian in the junta

government, and prior to his appointment as Premier he
served as the chief prosecutor in the Greek Supreme Court.
Initially, Papadopoulos accepted the position of
Minister to the premier, Pattakos took over the ministry
of the interior, and r"lakarezos became minister of
coordination.

Although all three apparently had equal

power, Papadopoulos gradually emerged as the boss.
According to Time,8 Papadopoulos in a three month
period established a general directorate of governmental
policy, operating under his personal control.

The

directorate gave. him veto power over all laws drafted
by the various ministers.
his own

cabine~

In addition, Papadopoulos created

which superseded the work of regular

ministries in fields such as press censorship, sports
and civil service.

Papado~oulos

also relieved Pattakos

of command of the politically powerful Armored Forces
Training Center near Athens and gave command of the Center
to his own men.

In a conference wivh Makarios, President

of Cyprus, Papadopoulos declared, "I am the boss in Greece". 9
8l1Greece:
p.

39-40.

9Ibid •

I am the Boss II, Ti1E.e. t (September 15, 1967) t

10
Before the end of the junta's first eight months
in power there were signs that King Constantine was not
satisfied with the role he played in the newly formed
government.

Traditionally, the King is the commander-in

chief of the Greek Armed Forces and is thought to have
complete control

over'~he

Royal Greek Army.

However,

this was not the case under the new military government.
The King's power over and his influence within the Armed
Forces were weakened because the new government was composed
of military men who had the support and loyalty of the
Ii

Greek Armed Forces.

This kind of support was, of course,

critically essential for the success of the coup d ' etst.
Although Papadopoulos seemed to be in complete
control of the Royal Greek Armed Forces, King Constantine
on December 13, 1967, attempted a counGer-coup against
the military dictatorship.

He was unsuccessful in his
effort to rally military support against the junta. 10
When King Constantine realized that his counter-coup

had failed, he escaped to Rome with the Royal family.
The King's escape to Italy eliminated him as a
serious contender for power.

Certain confidential Greek

sources contend that King Constantine just wanted to find
a way out, since he was unable to control or influence
the direction the junta was taking.

Others contend that

10Stockton Bayard, "How the Colonels Trapped the King",
The Reporter, (February 22, 1968), p. 31-33.

11.
the King did not act very rationally and did not plan
the counter-coup very carefully.
Since the junta had the whole country in a tight
grip, all the movements made by Constantine were likely
known to it, as indicated in the following: ll
The junta knew all of Constantine's movements.
They knew he used his trips to talk to the
loyal officers. In fact, the King was officially
warned that his excursions and conspiratorial
meetings were frowned upon. Presumably all of
Constantine's communications were known to the
junta. Indeed, the colonels may well have been
able to control what information was allowed
into royal hands and added some of their own.
There was almost nothing the Palace could
accomplish in secret.
If the junta knew of Constantine's every move,
~hen

it is obvious that the military dictators were

aware of what the King was planning and did nothing
to stop it, until the countercoup was declared.

The

junta was not concerned at all about the events planned
for December 13, 1967.

liThe junta \-1aS so confident of

the People's mood that it did not even disconnect
the city's phone system as it had done during the coup
that brought it to power last April".12

The

11Stockton Bayard, "HO\'J the Colonels Trapped the Kingll,
(February 22, 1968), p. 31.

Reporte~,

12Ibic.!, p. 31.
See
The Political Situation In Greece From 1944 to Our
Days., A Greek Government Pubrication (Athens: Ministry To The
"i"C". rrime Minister, Press And Information Department, Foreign
Press Division, 1968), p. 16-18.

12.

The junta bad set a trap for the King.

Its success

eliminated him as an obstacle to the junta's rule and at
the same time showed thBt Constantine was not popular
with the Greek people and the Royal Army.
Following Constantine's abortive countercoup, tbe
junta retired or dismissed most of the senior army
officers.

This was done not only to eliminate any

opposition that might still exist within the army, but
..

also to make room for the promotion of junior officers
and to complete the "Revolution" by installing AI'med
Forces friends and supporters into every key position.
According to Stockton Bayard;
The junta had dismissed not dozens but hundreds
of senior officers to make way for the young
and ambitious in the lower ranks. Some sixty
senior officers have so far been removed
since December 13, on suspicion of sympathy
if not support of the King. 1 3
Papadopoulos, by removing the old hierBrchy from
the Armed Forces, succeeded in his attempt to eliminate
any possible competitors for power.

The Army lost its

old leadership and was replaced by Espadopoulos' loyal
men.

Papadopoulos was thus in complete control of tbe

only body that could turn the tables in Greece.
Because it was necessary according to the 1952'
constitution that all governmental operations have the

13
approval of the King, and because the King had escaped
to Italy following his abortive countercoup, the junta
moved quickly to solve this problem, as indicated: 14
The King confided to friends that he had
no plans for an immediate return. Meanwhile,
the government in Athens seemed to be preparing
for a somewhat more prolonged royal absence.
By decree, it appointed an administrative and
household staff for the temporary regent,
Lieut. General George Zoetakis, so that he
can carryon the full official duties of
Greece's head of state.
Although General Zoetakis was given no power as
head of state except that given to him by the ruling
junta, his role serves to give legitimacy to actions
taken by the military government.

Greece is still a

royal monarchy under the law.
Around January 1968, Andreas Papandreou was
released from prison,15 the result of political
pressure from the U.S.".A. and other wes.tern countries.
He was later deported to Paris, where he set up
headouarters of a Greek government in exile. 16
Papandreou became Premier of the exile government ar.d
Kalliyiannis Vice Premier.

Ampatielos was designated

14nGreece ff , Time
' (January 5, 1968), p. 32.
15 Ibid , p. 32.
16M. Periphanakis, "Formation of Government Outside
Greece Gives Premiership to Andreas Papandreou", Atlantis,
LXXV (October 6, 1968), p. 1.

14

as minister of labor, Melina Mercouri as minister of
education, E. Blahou as minister of foreign affairs,
and Nikos Nikolaides as minister of the treasury (first
names of all members of the "government in exile" were
not given by the source of information, Atlantis).
The purpose of the formation of the "Greek Government
in Exile" was to form an organized resistance to the
military dictatorship in Greece.

Papandreou does not

recognize the military junta as the legal government
of Greece because it is not an elected government but
one which came to power with the force of army, tanks
and guns.
Meanwhile, the head of the ruling junta George
Papadopoulos, lost no time in touring Greece and
publishing government pamphlets stating his views and
explaining his reasons for the April 21 coup d'etat.
Papadopoulos's campaign by tour and government
publications sought to justify the actions the military
had taken and played upon the fear of the people that
the communists would have taken over if the Army had
not interfered.
(~o

In a book entitled "Our Creed"

Pistevomas), Papadopoulos published speeches made to

the foreign press justifying his actions.

The book

includes IIhis thoughts", similar in format to those of
Chairman Mao Tse Tung. l ?
l?George Papadopoulos, To Pistevomas, A Greek Govern
ment Pub1ication(Athinai: Ekdosls Genikrs-Diefthinseos
Tipou, April 1968).

15
In all of his speeches to the Greek people,
Papadopoulos sought to associat'e his coup with the
Truman Doctrine.

The main points of his talks centered

around the idea that as the Truman Doctrine had saved
Greece from the communists after world war II, so also
did the military coup of April 21, 1967. 18 It is

, I

, understandable why Papadopoulos had chosen this method
of convincing the Greek people to accept his I1revolutionll.
The Greeks continue to hold bitter and horrifying memories
from the lIAntartopolemon", guerilla warfare, which followed
I

world war II.

In most parts of Greece, communism is

synonymous with criminality.

Papadopoulos then sought

to reduce everything down to black and white.

Because

communism is a dirty word in most parts of Greece,
Papadopoulos declared that his IIrevolution"' was a necessity
in order to rid the imminent threat of a communist
take-over in Greece.

Anyone who was against the April

21 coup, had to be either communist, or a communist
sympathizer, which, of course, justified any means to
rid the country of such people.
In a question and answer period following a speech
to foreign correspondents, Papadopoulos declared that
only the communists had been rounded up and had been
stripped of their rights

as ,citizens of Greece. 19

16

A sample of the questions and answers is as f'0110ws: 20
(literal translation from Greek to English):
Question: How much time do you think will be
needed so that Greeks will be taught to act
accordingly politically? And when will the
Greek people be ripe for new elections?
Answer: ~he training of the Greek people will
be lengthy. I am not in a position to give a
certain, date. Answering the second part of the
question, I say that elections will take place as
soon as possible, and as soon as the nation is
secured, we will return to constitutional life.
Question: You have said before that the reason
why the "revolution" came was to stop communism.
How do you justify the arrests of people who we
all know never were nor are communists, such as
Papakonstantinou, and Zigdis?
Answer: Surely in my opinion they are not
communists. If they happened to be communists
they are free to say it. But communists
although they never constituted danger number
wise, never the less have long experience in
exploiting every human weakness. This makes it
possible for them to even make people believe
they are black alLhough they are white. The
above mentioned individuals were then arrested
in order to avoid bloodshed, as it would have
happened if they were not~pprehended.
In another question and answer session before
French journalists on May 28, 1967, Papadopoulos answered
questions concerning the revolution.

An example (literal

translation from Greek to English):2l
Question: What are the actual
lives of the Greek People today
Answer: The answer is somehow
words I can say that the people
itself.
20Ibid, p. 83-87.

-

2li1bid , p. 40-44.

changes in the
after the Itrevolution?"
long. Wit~ two
were redeemed from

17
Throughout his speeches directed to the foreign
-press and to Greek Americans, 22 Papadopoulos p'ortrayed
,

himself as savior of the nation.

In one of his many

statements Papadopoulos described the Greek:nation
as being an ill person, in need of medical surgery.23
Of course, the doctor happened to be the one and only
now famous surgeon, George Papadopoulos.
To ingrain his thoughts in the -people of Greece,
and on Greeks living abroad, George Pa-padopoulos devoted

I
I'

a section of a book of his public speeches to what he
called the "Historical Extracts From the Speeches of
the Greek President George Papadopoulou".

'J:he book

was published by the Greek government and has been widely
distributed to all Greeks.
oo~muriities

Distribution to the Greek

in the United States was made by the

Greek Orthodox Archdiocese.
The following are a few extracts from the thoughts
of George Papadopoulos. 24 (Literal translation from Greek
ilo English).
1. Communism will never have any place among
the Greek-Christianism.
2. The salvation of our country has more meaning
for us than the belief for regular -political future
as long as the present situation is thought to be
necessary to save the nation.
2ZIbid p. 52-53.
-'
2?Ibid, p. 11.
24-Ib id

-'

p. 163-206.

I
I
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3. Democracy was born here. The ideas for
individual and social r~eedom were developed here.
4. We are passengers in a ship to which we
are indebted to steer in a safe course towards
which the nation is predestined.
5. Communism is a very well organized mInority.
6. We all are indebted to proceed together towards
the predestination of our race.
7. We must all become bearers of the 21st of
April spirit.
8. The revolution did not consider nor is consi
dering anything else except the nation's salvation.
9. I do not think that there is any nation in
the world thot permits those who are insane or those
who break the laws to circulate free in the society.
10. Greece is now marching with determination,
with strength, and with faith in the path of her
great predestination.
11. The population and the national government
have undertaken the crusade for the rebirth and for
the progress of the nation.
12. The April 21st revolution was not a movement
by a few persons, groups, or social classes. It was
a revolution for mutual independence.
13. It is very important sometimes that Greece
also become well-governed, entirely of persons that
know how to live in an organized society and not
in a jungle.
14. The slave does not have the opportunity to
think. He is then indebted to carry out what the
regime thinks is proper for him to do.
15. ~he revolution was a historical necessity.
16. we struggle to erase the pain from the
hUJ'!an society, which is called Greece.
1/.
We must establish Greece as an example
of f~~ . rule-loving, and harmonious living
society of human beings.
18. For God's sake, we the Greeks have a heavy
inheritclTIce. It is not possible for us to have
any kind of relationship with the tyranny of
communism. We must protect ourselves not to
fall prey to communistic propaganda.
19. Greece is not permited to die. We are
obligated to keep Greece alive, we are obligated
that Greece becomes great.
It is evident that the junta tries to justify its
actions by portraying itself as the savior of the Greek
Nation and by playing on the people's fears of communism.

19
The New Oonstitution
As the work of the "revolution" moved very rapidly
in touching all sectors of private and public life in
Greece, a commission was appointed almost immediately
to draw up a new constitution.

The constitution

p.

1952 was set aside.

On May 5th, 1967, the military government of
Greece announced the reformation of the old constitu Lo

,<,n.

The Colonels declared that a new constitution was in
order to enable the country to meet its new "expectationsll.25
The national government almost immediately
proceeded to take steps to that effect.

As a first

step towards the drafting of a new constitution, the
government leaders directed the appointment of a twenty
member commission to make studies and recommend
alterations to the 1952 constitution.

Mr. Harilaos

Mitrelias, ~resident of the State Council, was named
chairman. 26
The commission proceeded to work on its assigned
task, and on December 23, 1967, it presented to the
25Study Of The New Constitution, A Greek Government
Publica'tion (Athens: Ministry To 'rhe Prime Minister, Press
And Information Department, Foreign Press Division, 1968),
p. 2.

26George Papadopoulos, To Pistevomas,A Greek Government
Publication (Athinai: Ekdos:LS Genikis Diefthinseos
Tipou, April 1968), p. 99-102.
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national government a draft of the new constitution.
After the draft was studied by the national government,
it was released for publication on Marcn 15, 1968, to
enable the people to "contribute to it" before it was
presented to them for approval. 27
The terminationcdate for public debate was May
31, 1<968.

During the two and a half months "studyll

period the government claimed that it received:
More than five million post cards,--making
it possible to sound the views of the public
opinion and thus facilitating the National
Government in its intention to provide the
country with a new Constitution meeting
the wishes and the will of the Greek people. 28
FollQwing a review of the recommendations made by
the Metrelias Commission and supposedly by the Greek
people, the National Government leaders, after long
discussion with other members of the government, drew the
final draft of the new constitution and then released
it for publication during the first half of July 1968. 2 9
From July to the election, the leaders of the
IIrevolutionary" government worked feverishly and tirelessly
to set the mood, to convince the Greek people to vote
27Studt Of The New Constitution, A Greek Government
Publication Athens:-Ministry To The ~rime Minister,
Press And Information Department, Foreign Press Division,
1968), p. 2-3.
28Ibid

-'

p. 3.

29Ibid t p. 3.
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"yes" on the newly formed constitution.

According to

several Greek friends who were in Greece during that
period, the leaders of the "revolutionery government ll
led a massive campaign of IINai" (Yes) votes for the
new constitution.

fhey covered all naked walls with

"Nai" posters, and opposition to their campaign \, .S
prohibited.
According to a number of sources,

governmen~

leaders used the clergy in the campaign to give
legitimacy to the government's acts.

~he

government's

main slogan was said to be "Greece for Greek Christians".
Reportedly priests were compelled to accompany
members of the government campaigning for the new
constitution.

It is understandable why the regime

chose, this campaign method in trying to convince the
Greek people to accept the new constitution.' Historically,
it is the clergy that always has provided leadership to
the Greek people in times of despair •. It was the clergy
that kept alive in every Greek the fire of patriotism
during the Turkish occupation, and it was the clergy
that first raised the Greek flag in 1821 and called on
the Greek population to rise up against the Turks.
Even today the leadership of Ithe clergy is valued and
is respected as much as it w1s in the past.

A ready

example is the Archbishop oflCyprus, Makarios, who
I

with his traditional leadersiip united the Oypriots,
I

I
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led them in their fight for independence from Britain,
and was ultimately elected President of Cyprus.
Despite the advantages accruing from the lack of
any organized opposition to its campaign for the new
constitution, the Greek military government took no
chances.

As reported by the Associated Press in Athens:

The Greek regime ordered military and
police units on alert Baturday and issued
a last-minute appeal for a massive "Yes lt
vote in 3unday's Constitutional referendum.
Foreign Minister Panayiotis Pipinelis
pleaded for other countries to help the
regime by easing opposition. He insisted
that despite the existence of martial
law, lithe referendum is free, without
any pressure the people can vote according
to their conscience." All open opposition,
however, was forbidden. Boldiers and police
stood by to quell any possible demonstrotiun
of dissent. Extra buses, trains, and ships
were laid on in a final stepped-up effort to
get all eligible voters back to their homes
in time to cast ballots. Few Greeks had any
doubt about the outcome should the constitution
be turned down. Deputy Premier Spylianos
Patakos said Friday that in event of a
rejection: "VJe vJould be obliged to draft
a new constitution, ~Bt under conditions
of more discipline".
The following account of what went on during the
Constitutional referendum was given by several Greek
friends who were living in Greece at the time.
On Sunday, September 2'j, 1968, the Cl.tl.es
were crowded with armed police and military
units. Some of them were stationed as guards
in poll places and major intersections, and

30 nGreek Regime Urges Constitution Passage", The
Sunday Oregonian, September 29, 1968, Section I, p.~
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others were' used to patrol the cities. Battle
ready soldiers were searching house to house
looking for people who did not go to the polls.
One of my friends told me that during the day
of the referendum, several soldiers broke
into the hou!.::le of his parents. They f'ound his
mother baking bread, and forced her at gunpoint,
and without allowing her to change into a
different dress or wash off her flour-covered
hands to go to the polls and vote on the new
Constitution. I was told that most of the
Greeks voted at gun-point, surrounded by
military and police units. Another difficulty
which the Greek people had in express~ng their
approval or disapproval, and vote according to
their conscience was the way that the ballots
were made up. According to my Greek friends,
the "Yes" ballots were in blue color, and the
"No" ballots were in red. I was told that if
someone picked the "No" ballot which was colored
reti, he was automati~ally admitting that he was
a "Red" or a communist.

i

I

i:

I'

It is clear from the above that the Greek people
not only did not have a "yes" or "no" choice, they were
also denied the right to remain away from the polls.
As was expected, the Greek people overwhelmingly
approved the new constitution.

The result as reported

by the govc;,rnment was as follows: 31

!

1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Registered voters: 6,516,285
Voted: 5,048,981
Valid ballots: 5,030,466
Invalid ballots: 18,515
"Yes" votes for the new Constitution: 4,638,543
"No" votes against the new Constitution: 391,423
Of course, the results were only what the regime

chose to let the public know.

31 "Complete results on the Constitutional Referendum,

Sunday April 29," "Atlantis, LXXV (October 6, 1968), p. 1.

,;
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On November 8, 1968, the results of the referendum
were approved by the Greek Supreme Oourt: 32
The Greek Supreme 00urt Friday ratified the
results of the Sept. 29 referendum in which
Greek voters approved the new constitution put
before them by the military dictatorsbip. The
court's approval paved the WDy for the
constitution to go into effect on ounday when
it is publislled in the government gazette. Not
all of the 138 articles become effective imme
diately. Ten dealing with press and individual
freedom,remain temporarily suspended. The new
charter replaces a constitution approved by the
Greek Parliament in 1952.
Part of Article 138 of the new constitution
provides that the regime can delay any individual
rights until it has enough time to complete the aims
of the revolutibn; the regime can rule by decree on any
matter. 33
The new constitution establishes Greece as a
crowned democracy, strips the King of most of the powers
given to him under the 1952 constitution, and increases
the power and authority of the Executive.

Moreover, it

establishes the Greek armed forces as the defender of the
new political and social system.
A partial summary of the 1968 constitution is as
3'2nOourt Backs Greek Vote", The Oregonian,
November 10, 1968, Section 1, p. 4.
33Shedion Tou Neou
Greek Governmen
u
Simvoulion, 1968).
/
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.tollows: 34 (literal translation from Greek to English).
1. Article 2. All powers are derived from the
people. The people are the source of all
authority. The King has no prerogatives nor
powers except those which are explicitly given
to him by the Constitution.
2. Article 14. Yellow press which contributes
to the destruction of morols, democracy, and
deviates from the true mission of the press is
punished. After the second offence within five
years, the court shall order the suspension of
the publication temporarily, or permanently.
3. Article 42. The King will rule only
through the elected and responsible representatives
of the people. No act of the King shall be
valid nor will it be carried out unless it is
also countersigned by a competent minister,
also alone by his signature assumes responsibility
for such an act.
4. Article 46. Only by the consent of the
notional council may the King dissolve the
Parliament. The King has no legislative power
according to the new constitution. He only
issues and promulgates the laws.
5. Article 48. The executive has the power
not only to publish executive decrees, he also
has the power to regulate decrees of legislative
content, provided he has authorization from the
chamber of deputies. During emergencies or in
urgent situations, the executive has also
legislative powers by decrees, which become
acts of law.
6. Article 54. This article creates the
National Council, and its major functions are
as follows:
1. It will assist the King to make
right decisions on important matters.
2. Will assist in apPoiriting the
Prime Minister when not nominated by
the Parliament because of a deadlock
over such nomination.
3. Will assist in dissolving Parliament.
7. Article 57. The members of Parliament are
reduced from the original number of 300, to a
maximum of 150. Also at least one sixth of the
members of?Parliament must be elected by the
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entire body of voters, which constitutes
the whole nation. This is done to avoid
the dependency of candidates upon local
and personal ties. The constitutional court
has the power to choose between 25-30
members of Parliament. (By this method,
the court can deny the majority to any party
it chooses).
8. Article 58. Political party leadership
will no longer oe personal or a family affair.
Political party leaders shall be popularly
elected in local and national conventions.
Political parties shall be required to
maintain records of their incomes and
expenses. All kinds of contributions must
be listed by name, and each year during
the month of February such party must
publish its financial statements. The
Constitutional Court shall decide if a party
is legal upon sUbmission of its charter to the
Court. (The Court by this has the power of
granting permission for the formation of a
party) •
9. Article 88. No member of Parliament
may be-appointed at a cvbinet of the government,
with the exception of the Prime Minister, and
the deputy prime ministers. Even if a member
of Parliament resigns his parliamentary seat,
he cannot be aDpointed to any governmental
position. (Members of ~arliament were
appointed to governmental positions under the
1952 constitu~ion).
10. Article 89-92. The Prime Minis~er shall
make all general policy, and shall supeJ:"vise to
the application of the laws. The deputy ministers
shall assist the Prime Minister. Undersecretaries
shall be held personally pesponsible for carrying
out the duties which fall within their juris~iction.
11. Article 106. With this article, the
Constitutional Court was created. The major
functions of the Constitutional Court are;
Articles 61-63-65.
1. To declare on the validity of
provisions and laws.
2. To approve charts of political
parties and dissolve such parties if they
are found to work against the laws of the
land, and against democracy.
3. To investigate elections, and rule on
their validity.

I

I,'i

I
I

:1

.

i

I

i

I

I,

I

I
; I

I

2?

I

12. Article 112. No civilians may come under
the jurisdiction of military courts, naval courts,
and airforce courts except for criminal offences
against the security of the armed forces.
13. Article 124. The Armed Forces have the
respons'!bility of defending the existing social
and political system against any "insidious attempt".
14. Article 127. At the beginning of each
session, the Parliament will elect by a two-thirds
majority a commissioner to assist in the Parliamentary
control. (This is modeled after the Swedish
Ombudsman).
15. Article 129. Although for historical reasons
the King is the leader of the armed forces, the
administration and command of such forces will be
exercised by the elected civilian government
through the chief of staff.
16. Article 138. This article upon the
signature of the Prime Minister becomes effective,
with the exception of the articles which permit
the basic freedoms. (Article 138 in effect
postpones promises of free assembly, free strikes,
free press, and free political parties until the
military regime decides to permit such freedoms.
What the people voted then on September 29, 1968,
was a promise for their freedom some day
whenever that may be).
In short, Greece today is ruled by a military
dictatorship in the person of George Papadopoulos.

Greek

citizens have no civil rights except what Papadopoulos
decides to hand out to them on a day-to-day

basi~.

•
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OHAPTER III
HOW IT WAS BEFORE APRIL 21"

1967

A' brief background of Modern Greek Politics.

Since Greece freed herself from Turkish rule in
1821, she has been dominated by her allies (Britain

~nd

the United States) and treated primarily as an essential

I

I

I'

I

, I

strategic Mediterranean base at the expense of her
national sovereignty.
Modern Greek politics has its beginning when
the Greeks accepted Othon as their King.

This was

accomplished through the efforts of the Triple Alliance
and the influence of Great Britain.
of Ludwig, King of Bavaria.

Othon was the son

Early in 1833 he was

delivered to Greece aboard a British warship.35
When Othon abdicated some twenty-nine years later,
the British again intervened to insure that Greece
would remain a monarchy.

This time a member of the

Glucksburg family, and an ancestor of King Oonstantine,
was installed on the throne.
Since Greece's independence in 1821, Greek
politics has been oriented to the Great Idea (Megaloidea)
35H.A. Lidderdale, IVlakritannis: The Memoirs of
General Makriyannis 1797-1864 London: OXford university
Press, Ely House, 1966), p. 149.
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that the Greeks re-establish the empire of ancient
Byzantium.

As a result of the Great Idea, a series

of wars with the Turks ensued to establish a I'Greater
Greece l1 •
To finance such wars, Greece was forced to borrow
large sums of foreign capital especially from the British,
'and as Greece's debts to Britain grew, British dominance,
over Greek foreign and domestic policy was achieved.

II

On the economic side, the British achieved ownership of
all public utilities, mining of all sorts, transportation,
and valuable pieces of real estate in all parts of Greece.
IV1ajor portions of the entire Greek economy were controlled
by the British.

As 'a result, and also because the "wars"

failed to achieve a Grea,ter Greece, a series of plots and
coups occured.;6
;6Stephen Rousseas, The Death of • Democracy~ Greece
and the American Conscience (New York: Grove Press, Inc.,

J967),

p.

73-14.

It is sometimes maintained that plots and coups are
part of the Greek character and will occur whether or not
foreign powers intervene in Greek internal affairs. The
author however, does not accept this assumption. He views
the main causes for the political instability in Greece as
follows: 1) the King has always been looked upon by the
republican forces as being ,an instrument of foreign powers
who govern Greece through him; 2) the King is a non-Greek
who was installed in Greece by ',foreign powers, who have in
many instances intervened to keep him in power or to return
him from a forced exile; ;) since the King owes his position
and, power to the support of foreign powers, he feels no
obligation towards the Greek people'nor is he sympathetic·
'to their problems, but instead constantly works on a
"divide and conquer" policy towards Greek political leaders.
Since Greece has never been left alone to manage
her affairs, it is not known whether she would be
politically more stable without foreign intervention.

I'I
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As the Monarchy sought to gain strength, it openly
al'gned itself with the military.

This alliance brought

public oppostition to the Monarchy and, subsequently, the
exile of King George II on two separate occasions prior
to the outbreak of the Second World War.

During the

King's periods of exile, the republican forces sought to
. strengthen their power within the Greek armed forces,
but their attempts failed.

The reason for the failure

to gain any power within the armed forces was that high
ranking republican officers were purged by the well
entrenched royalist officers who, through the support
of the Allies, always held all key positions within the
Greek armed forces •. As a result of the republican
failure to gain strength within the Greek armed forces,
King George II was returned to Greece from his second
exile after a rigged plebiscite in his favor gave him
ninety-seven per cent of the votes in 1935. 37
Following his return to Greece, King George II
installed John Metaxas, a right-wing General of the Greek
Army,' as prime minister.

On the pretence that Greece was

in danger of being overtaken by communists, Metaxas (evidently
with the King's approval) staged a coup which not only
eliminated all open opposition to the King, but also ended
constitutional government in Gre.ece.
37Ibid, p. 74.

Following the coup,
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Metaxas lost no time in exiling (during this period
Andreas Papandreou, a young university student, was
exiled to the United States) or placing under arrest
all political oppostition.

He also dissolved parliament

and established a government similar in sUbstance and
form to that of Hitler's.38
Henceforth, until the time of his death in January
29, 1941, Metaxas ruled the Country with an iron hand.
Although ',the Greek people were dissatisfied
with the Metaxa's dictatorship, they arose spontaneously
and expelled the Italian invading forces from Greek soil.
About this time, however, Metaxas died and the Germans
came to the aid of their retreating allies, the Itali.ns.
Several months after the German assault, the Greek armed
forces were defeated, and the Oountry fell under German
occupation.
During the period of German control,

high ranking

political and military leaders in the Greek government
collaborated with the invaders and were later recognized
by the German occupation forces as the legitimate
government of Greece as a reward.39 The occupation of
38Ibid

-'

p. 74.

39w.A. Heurtley, H.O. Darby, O.W. Orawley and
O,.. M•. Woodhouse, A Short History of Greece (New York:
Bentley House, 1967), p. 145.
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Greece by Germany forced King George II to go into
exile for the third time.

He took his political friends

with him and made them members of his Greek government
in exile.

Metaxas's machine, however, continued to

operate for the duration of the German occupation under
.the different

II

quisling" regimes.

During this period,

various resistance groups sprang up in all parts of the
country.

The strongest one was led bJ the communists and

was initially aided by the British.

However, this resistance

group lost British support in 1943.

The British shifted

their aid to the monarchy-oriented guerillas, as Britain
wished to insure the return of King George II to the Greek
throne.

Evidently the British wanted to make certain that

their dominance in Greece after the war would not be
diminished nor threatened by the left of the republican
forces. 40
Although the King's government in exile (this
government was appointed at the will of the King and
represented only his views) was in constant communication
with the resistance forces, it failed to appreciate and
heed the strength of

anti-monar~hical

in occupied

It continued to act as if the

Greece~

feeling developing

Greek people supported its dealings with other
40Stephen Rousseas, The
and the American Conscienc~e~~~~~~~~~~~~~~n~c~.-,~
1967), p. 75.
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governments. 41 It made such agreements as that which
surrenderdthe Greek forces under British Command, and
that with the United States providing for Lend-Lease
supplies.
Meanwhile, those in the resistance movement inside
Greece, primarily led by communist and venizelist elements
(the venizelist movement was named after Eleftherios
Venizelos, a republican who served as prime minister of
Greece from 1910 to 1920), made an agreement that after
the war they would oppose the return of the King. 42 The
principal supporters of the King's return to Greece were
the King's government in exile, the British, and the
collaborators inside Greece.

I

The British government

supported the King and his government in exile as the
legitimate rulers of Greece, but, because they also
needed the support of the resistance forces inside Greece,
they did not force the issue at the time. 43
In July 1943, the King under British pressure
promised a "fully representative" government after Greece's
liberation, to be followed by elections for a constitutional
, 1 y Wl. th ln
. SlX
. mon,th s. 44 F 0 11 oWlng
.
th 1S
. s t a t emen t
sssemo

on abortive mutiny attempt within the Greek forces in Egypt

4: 1 W.A. Heurtley, H.C. Darby, O.i,V. Orawley and

C.l"l.

Woodhouse, A Short History of Greece (New York: Bentley House,

1967), p. 147.
42 Ibid , p. 145.

43Ibid, p. 146.
44Ibid , p. 150.
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occured.

(The mutiny was led by anti-monarchists and was

rapidly supressed by British forces).

This was followed

by the resignations of several of the King's governments
in succession.

Since the King solely appointed his

governments in exile, each time there was disagreement
with the King's policies the leaders of such governments
had no alternative but to resign.
Meantime, George Papandreou escaped from Greece
in the middle of 1943 and was asked by the King to form
a government.

Upon his acceptance, Papandreou decided

to call a conference in Lebanon to form a government of
national unity, with the leaders of the resistance
participating.

The leaders of the resistance force

reluctantly agreed to Papandreou's proposal and finally
joined his government.

The agreement between Papandreou

and the resistance forces allowed the Allies to take over
Greece without bloodshed, and Papandreou's government
of national unity (formed in exile with leaders of the
guerilla force participating) became the first government
in liberated Greece as the GermanFl withdrew til'jthe
north in October 1944.45
In November of 1944, General Scobie, the British
Commander in Greece, ordered the dissolution of the guerilla
forces.

As a result of this order relations among members

45Ibidt p. 150.
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of the Greek government (government of national unity)
began to deteriorate.

The communist and other ministers

representing the guerilla faction left the government.
The leaders of the guerilla forces refused to disband.
The withdrawal of the guerilla faction from the government
was followed by an outbreak of violence between the
Greek and the British authorities on the one side, and
the guerilla forces on the other.

The fighting was so

fierce that the British were forced to bring in large
reinforcements from Italy.

Meantime, negotiations were

initiated between the British and the guerillas.
was achieved.

A truce

The guerillas were to lay down their arms,

and the government was expected to make liberal reforms.
Amnesty for political crimes and a plebiscite on the question
of the Monarchy to be held under international supervision
were promised. 46 When the results of the truce did not
materialize, things began to deteriorate again.

By this

time however, the British had thrown all of their support
behind the right-wing royalist group.

British concern

over Greek affairs was observed by William Hardy McNeil,
a postwar U.S. Assistant Military Attache in Athens: 4 7 .
46 Ibid , p. 151.
47Stephen Rousseas, The Death of a Democracy-Greece
and the American Conscience (New York:. Grove Press, Inc.,

1967),

p.

77-78.
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Irheir first and principal concern was that the
government of Greece should always be friendly
towards them; and the men who shaped British
policy for Greece were by this time firmly
convinced that an EAM (Left) government would
not be friendly. Exactly whbt "friendly" meant
was not clear. Probably it meant in part
the re-establishment of economic concessions
to British-owned public utility and other
companies; but in the last anolysis, and far
more important, it meant a government in Greece
that would side with Great Britain in case
of another war.
Apparently the British were not concerned about
what the interests of the Greek people were, but only
what best served British interest.

Even though the right

wing royalist faction enjoyed little support from the
people, the British supported it.
Under the terms of an agreement(see pp. 34-35 and
footnote no. 46) between the Greek and British governments
on the one hand and the guerillas on the

other~

the

resistance forces layed down their arms and disbanded.
On the other hand, the rif,htist faction with the assistance
of the British troops spread into all parts of Greece,
taking retributions on their political opponents.

(This

was in violation of an earlier promise by the British
and Greek governments of political amnesty for all).
The activity of the right was so disruptive that
Clement Attlee, the British Prime Minister, cabled the
Greek Regent(the Primate of Greece was designated by the
Greek government as regent of Greece until the King's
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return in September 1946) in August, 1945, that he was
"disquited at the information of new excesses on the
part of the Right".48
Long after the resistance forces Bad layed dawn
their arms and dissolved their forces, the Greek
government depended upon British troops to maintain
control over the country.

This, of course, assured

the British of the return of their prewar capital
concessions, including control over Greek public
utilities.

As one American official in Greece at that

time stated: 4 9

"Greece had become a client state of the

British, who had effectively limited (one might say
terminated) the sovereignty of the Greek government".
From the time the Left put down its arms, in
February 1945, to the time of the election in March of
1946,
an estimated 85,000 Greeks were arrested
and 1,300 killed. Neither the police nor the
gendarmerie were purged of wartime
collaborators •••Efforts of the Prime Minister
to limit royalist control of the army were
blocked by the British Military Mission, which
accused him of trying to play politics with
the army, and by General Scobie and the British
Ambassador. Control of Greece's air force and
n~vy.was i8 the hands of other special British
m~ss~ons.'

48Ibid

- - ' p. 80.

49Ib~;!, p. 81.

50 Ibid, p •. 80.
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As was expected, the government that emerged from
the March, 1946, elections was, controlled by the royalist
forces.

The date for the plebiscite on the question of

the King's return to Greece was set for September, 1946.
The plebiscite was held as scheduled, (the vote was
approximately eighty-one per cent for the return of the
King) and on the twenty-eight of the same month King
George II arrived in

Greece.51 With the King's arrival,

guerilla activity agaanst the royalist forces increased.

!,

In December, 1946, the government brought charges at the
United Nations Security Council that Yugoslavia,

Bulga~ia

and Albania were supporting guerilla activity and therefore
threatening Greece's internal security.52
To investigate Greece's charges, the U.N. decided
to send a commission to Greece to gather additional
information on the spot.

Following the commission's

on-the-spot investigation and on the basis of its report,
the U.N. General Assembly condemned Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria and Albenia for aiding the guerillas in Greece.'
In March, 1947, King George II died, his youngest
brother Paul succeeded him to the throne, and the British
51w.A. Heurtley, H.C. Darby, C.W. Orawley and O~M.
Woodhouse, it Short History of Greece (New York: Bentley
House, 196 r?J,p. 154-155.
52Stepe hn Rousseas, The
and the american Oonscienc=e~~~~~~~~~~~~--~n~c~.-,~

T9b?j,-p. S3';-----'
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Ambassador in Washington informed the U.S. that because
of economic difficulties, Britain was forced to tterminate
her involvement in Greece.

The announcement by the

Sritish Ambassador brought an end to the British economic
and political dominance over Greece that had lasted for
more than one hundred years and ushered in a like dominance
by the United States through what is known today as the
Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947. 53
The Truman Doctrine, of course, was hailed by the

Ii

"right", for without British or American assistance
it could not have remained in power for long.

AS

ii

was the

case with the British, the U.S. also decided to throw
all of its support behind the rightist elements and all
of its might against the leftist guerillas.

Although

guerilla warfare continued until late in 1949, the
guerillas were finally defeated militarily.

!

They could

no longer withstand the far superior American military
might that had been thrust against them since 1947.
Following the end of the guerilla warfare, the U.S.
tried to set up a representative government in Greece
to reconstruct the country economically.
was not an easy task.

However, this

The main problems the United States
encDuntered in its self-assigned task were as follows: 54
53 Ibid

p. 8;.

54Ibid

p. 84-98.
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Governments were falling faster than they were formed,
corruption was running high in governmental circles
(the machinery of government had not basically changed
since Greece had won its independence from the Turks),
and inflation was increasing steadily.
Although political instability had been

a~ajor

part of Greek political life since Greece's independence,
the Right (with initially British and later American
military and economic support) not only managed to control
the formation of every government that came into existence
over the years, it also made all decisions concerning the
appointments of top military and governmental personnel.
However, with the formation of the CUP in 1961 ( the new
party was a coalition of all political parties except the
ERE and EDA), things began to change.
In the 1963 elections the CUP emerged as the major
party in Greece. 55
an absolute

Because none of the parties received

~majority

were scheduled.

of the popular vote, new elections

On the second election in February 16, 1964,

the CUP won an absolute majority.56

(Fifty-three per cent).

For the first time, the Right found itself in the
unusual position of being clearly in the elected minority.
Up to 1964-1965, the Right maintained full control
55Ibid, p. 21.
56Ibid, p. 22.
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over the government machinery.

'J:he police ,the army,

the rural gendarmerie and the bureaucracy in general
were controlled and staffed with "their own" people.

I

It is fair to say that Greece was the only nation on the

I

side of the Allies in which the Nazi collaborators were

I

not purged from their governmental positions at the end

I

of the war. 57
Although the Right was defeated in the polls for
the first time since Greece's independence in 1821,
the Palace, the

Righ~

and the Army did not appear

greately concerned, as they still had absolute control of
the bureaucracy and the security forces.

In other words,

they were still in full control of the "sub-level
governments" where the real power was.

On top of this,

Papandreou, wanting to please the Palace, appointed as
Defense Minister Petros Garoufalias, a stanch Palace
supporter, and made other pro-royalist appointments to his
goverrimen:b as well. 58
Greek affairs appeared to have stabilized, until the
Cyprus crisis exploded in 1966.

The Cyprus problem brought

abdut a rapid deterioration in the relations between Greece
and Turkey (both members oft.;he NATO Allience)
57 Ibid , p. 19.
58Ibid, p. 24.

which

I

I
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threatened. NATO's southeastern flank.

At this point,

Washington became alarmed, and began pressuring Greece
to resolve its difference (for example, the U.S.
i

suggested that Cyprus be partitioned between the Greek

I

and the Turkish communities) with Turkey according to
Washington's dictates.

II
jl

Papandreou however, refused to ad.t

I,'I
!

like a good satelite and decided to take an independent

i
jl

stand on what he thought were Greece's national interests.
As if Papandreou had not already gone far enough by
disobeying th(:) wishes of \vashington, his government
added more fuel to the fire by publicly

stat~ng

that

"it would welcome Soviet assistance in preparation for
a possible war with Turkey".

This prompted the U.s..

Embassy to demand an lexplanation".59

MoreoVier,

Papandreou threatened to remove the extreme right-wing
officers from the army's high command. 60 From this
point, Papandreou's government began to rapidly

skid

towards the confrontation that took place on April 21, 1967.
Meanwhile, Papandreou's behavior and public
statements began to alarm the "Right".

At the end of

1966 Papandreou was informed by "a wealthy Greek ship
owner", who '''had a conversation with his good friend
59 Ibid, p. 32.
60 Ibid

-'

p. 32.

Ii
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John McCone, director of the CIA", that: Q1
Major elements of the right-wing General
staff had began to doubt the patriotic
motives of the Center Union government
and were beginning to discuss a coup d'etat
shoul~ the government continue to pursue
its liberal policies.

II
:1

I

I

I

I,

I

I

I

II i

Upon receiving the above information (the informant

I II
II

is not known to the author), George Papandreou called a
secret meeting of his inner cabinet to discuss the
gradual replacement of the Army's General citaff.
Garoufalias (the Defense Minister and stanch supporter
of the Palace) reported immediately to the King what
was discussed during this secret inner cabinet meeting.
The King informed Papandreou that he would strongly
oppose any change in the High Comrnand·of the Greek Army.
The reaction of Papandreou and the cabinet was that
Garoufalias had to be replaced.

However, the attempt

to remove Garoufalias from office was blocked by the
King.

The struggle between Constantine and Papandreou

resulted finally in the army's take over on April 21, 1967.
The following section of this chapter will be
devoted to a more thorough account of the events that took
place from 1964 (the year that the Center Union came to
power), to 1967, when martial law was substituted for
61 Ibid

-'

p. 29.
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Parliamentary goveDnment in Greece.
What happened from 1964 to 1967.
When George Papandreou, a man of liberal ideas and
very anti-royalist, was elected premier in 1964, the
stage was set for a political showdown between the royal
palace and the Papandreouses.

It was no more than a

few months after his election that Papandreou found
himself in a political turmoil in his attempt to
exercise his duties as head of the Greek government.
A summary of the situation in Greece from 1964
to 1967 is given in the following: 62
George Papandreou was voted into power in
1964 as the head of the Union of the Center Pariy
He was joined by his son Andreas, an American
citizen and professor of economics at the
University of California who had returned to
Greece in charge of a recovery mission subsidized
by the Ford and Rockefeller foundations. The
eldest Papandreou made his son, still an
American citizen, the alternate minister of
coordination. George Papandreou started transfering
key officers and rightist appointees from the
Central Intelligence Service and the army high
command to points as far removed as possible from
the Athens area. This move would have excited
suspicion immediately had it not been for the
formation-then in progress-of an army contingent
for duty on Cyprus. The influx of rightist
officers into Cyprus pleased General George Grivas,
who is in charge of the army's Cyprus operation,
but displeased Archbishop Makarios, the President
of Cyprus, who was looking to Cypriot Communists and
the Soviet block for support. At the prompting
of his son, the senior Papandreou then reversed
his policy and began sending leftist officers to
Cyprus-among them members of the small Aspida
62George Bailey, "The Puritan revolt in Greece~.l!llL
Reporter, ~ay 18, 1geZ), p. 19-21.

<.
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(Shield) organization, whose aim was the overthrow
of the Monarchy and the severing of Greece's military
alliance with the West. This pleased Makarios
but displeased Grivas, who subsequently exposed the
Aspida conspiracy and implicated Andreas as
its leader.
The administrative investigation that followed
Griva's expose implicated twenty-eight officers,
including the deputy chief of intelligence and
the chief of intelligence on Cyprus. The young
new King, Constantine II, interceded and demanded
a full-scale judid~al investigation; •••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Papandreou refused to mount the investigation.
When the King turned directly to the Minister of
Defense and the investigation proceeded, Papandreou
dismissed the minister, who thereupon refused to
resign without a writ of dismissal signed by the'
King. The King in turn refused to sign until
a replacement was named. To his astonishment
Papandreou named himself. The King refused to
accept this, pointing out that he could not allow
Papandreou to preside .over an investigation of a
conspiracy in which his own son was implicated.
Thereupon Papandreou announced that he would
resign within twenty-four hours. Fearing that
Papandreou would use the twenty-four hours to
dissolve Parliament and call for new elections or
set an Aspida military coup in motion, the King
demanded that Papandreou resign then and there.
When Papandreou refused, the King aPiointed a new
Premier from the ranks of Papandreou s own party the
same night.
George Papandreou reacted to his ouster by taking
to the streets and attacking the King point-blank
on the issue of monarchy versus republicanism. "Who
rules Greece?" he asked, "The King or the people?"
In the turmoil that ensued, just enough members
of Papandreou's Center Union defected to allow the
conser~ative National Radical Union to govern in
coalition with the small Progressive Party and the
Center Union defectors.
After fifteen precarious months the coalition
E;overnment fell in December, 19b6, when the
Conservatives refused to support a new electoral
·law providing for proportional representation, a
system that would have favored the smaller and
splinter parties.
One more caretaker government under Ioanis
Paraskevopoulos was brought down on the issue of
Andreas Papan~reou's parliamentary immu~ity. In

.1

I
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March of this year an Athenian court had found
fifteen dfficers guilty of plotting against the
state and the monarchy in the Aspida conspiracy
trial. In accordance with the findings of the
court, the public prosecutor prepared charges of
high treason against Andreas Papandreou.
The prosecutor made application to Parliament
for the lifting of immunity of Andreas and
another deputy. while this was being considered,
Geor;~;e Papandreou' s Center Union proposed an
amendment to the election law to extend the legal
immunity of members after the dissolution of
Parliament.
King Constantine then tried to arrange for the
formation of a grand coalition between the
National Radical Union and the Center Union to
prepare the elections but; was rebuffed by his
long-confirmed enemy, George Papandreou.
The King's subsequent appointment of Pan,yotis
Kanelopoulos of the National Radical Union as
Premier drove the two Papandreous to a new pitch
of fury, the senior announcing that Constantine
was no longer liKing of Grf::'ece but King of the
National Radical Union," and the junior advising
the King publicly to choose a pleasant spot for
his exile.
When Kanelopoulos dissolved Parliament on
April 14 and called for elections on May 28 without
bothering to put the issue to a vote, his action
was almost universally accepted as the last storm
signal.
Another account as given by Ramparts Magazine: 63
It had been rumored that the King and the U.S.
had a longstanding deal: !lyou help me keep my throne,
and I'll keep Greece in NATO for you 11. (NATO, of course,
is the key to American interest in Greek politics).
The King was threatened by the P~pandreous--especially
young, popular Andreas. Certainly Andreas would
replace his aging father as Prime Minister if the
Papandreou,s' popular Center Union Party won the
nation0l elections set for May 28th. Andreas was out
to eradicate the political and economic oligarchy of which

63Stanle~ K. Sheinbaum, "Prelude", Ramparts, VI
(October, 19674 p. 43.

I
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the monarchy was an integral port, for which the
monarchy relied on the military, for which the
military relied on the U.S •. -all for NA'ro • •••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

As early as 1964, when Andreas' charismatic
leadership became evident, the plot against him
was set in motion • •••

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
So, when the May 28th elections drew near and
Andreas Papandreou's popularity remained strong,
it became apparent that he had to be cut off.
A coup was therefore in the making. A propaganda
base had been laid: Andreas was a pro-communist;
he might take Greece out of NATO. U.S. officialdom
was prepared for Andreas to go • •••

· But
. . with
. . .all
. .that
. . ground
. . . .work
. . laid,
. . . the
. . "official
.....

ll

coup got couped: An even more irresponsible group
of military made their move first, and today Greece
is not in the hands of an anti-democratic King with
U.S. support, but rather a radical fascist cliqu~.

Additional testimony is given by Andreas Vachliotis
and Kyriakos Diakogiannis, to Stanley Sheinbaum a
journalist for

Rampart~

magazine.

Vachliotis and

Diakogiannis claim that they were threatened and forced
by the Greek OIA to fabricate evidence against Andreas
Papandreou.
The testimony of Andreas Vachliotis follows: 64
This story begins in Paris in June 1964, where
I was spending my vacation. Andreas Papandreou
had just become Minister of Ooordination (the
highest-ranking post in the Greek government after
the Prime Minister) in the cabinet of his father,
Prime Minister George Papandreou • •

.. ...... .... . .. . .........
Andreas Papandreou, having spent 20 years as an
0.

economics professor at American Universities was

.
64Andreas Vach1iotis "The Testimony of Andreas
Vachliotis", Ramparts, VI ~October, 1967), p. lJ.4-46.
(Ii

.
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totally naive about the intricacies of Greek
Politics. He is a staunch democrat, a
respected economist and an honest man, but
because of his political inexperience, I was
very much afraid of the maneuvers other Greek
politicians were plotting behind his back • •••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I remained in Paris, but Andreas returned to Greece. • • •
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

He asked me to put some of my ideas into writing, and
during the month·i~ July, I wrote him a number of
memoranda.
It was one of these memoranda which was later used
as a pretext for putting Papandreou in jail • •••

·.......... ........ ......
~

It was seven typed pa ;: on yellowish paper, and it
is now in the hands of the Greek judicial authorities.
What this memorandum basically said was that
Paparldreou, to protect himself and establish his
father's government fully in control, should undertake
"the creation of an organization to control the
mechanism of the Greek state, both inside and outside
the country", to preempt control from agents of the
fascist-leaning military and secret police. I further
recommended, in that proposal, the "gradual replacement ll
of the military chiefs of staff, as well as the heads
of the police, gendarmerie, and the multitude of
secret police organizations, including KYP which, from
all evidence, were actively engaged in undermining
Papandreou's government • •••

·... . . . . . .. . .. .. .........
~

There was not the faintest suggestion, either in my
proposals or in any of my talks with Andreas Papandreou,
that the replacement of key officials should be
accompanied by violence or imprisonment--as KYP and
the junta were later to allege • •••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••

KYP was founded in 1950--its purpose to be roughly
comparable to that of the American CIA, which,
incidentally, helped start KYP • •••

· That
. . .KYP. .was. .out. .to. destroy
. . . . Papandreou
. . . . . .is. very
. . . clear:
.. .

to me. Takis Apostolopoulos, a key KYP agent, told
me just a few days before the coup that he "would
give my right arm to get Andreas Papandreou". Major
.Evangelos Tsaka:, now a special counselor to Minister
of the Prime Ministry Papadopoulos, also said to me
that Papandreou "ought to have been killed that same
night of the coup. \ve should get rid of him.". • ••
• • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
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In June of 1966, the KYP agent Apostolopoulos,
known to me then by the name Varikopoulos, came to
me and said that he wanGed the copies of the
memoranda I had prepared for Andreas two years before. • ••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
He told me that in the investigation of Papandreou,
already underway for two years, there were materials
incriminating me, too • •••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I finally gave in and said I would permit KYP to
make copies of the memorBnda, provided the originals
weI'e returned to me. 30, the agent took me to the
KYP build ing in Athens. • ••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
They took the memoranda~ay from me into a room
where I was told there was a photographic machine.
T~n minutes later, several KYP agents returned and
told me, lI we have decided 'lio keep tne documents and
not give them back to you. You cem go." •••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
KYP agent Apostolopoulos came to me again and told
me ~hat they wanted me to write down everything that
had happened between myself and Andreas Papandreou
in 1964. I did so, making clear that I thout;ht he
was an honest man, and a democrat, who would do the
right thing in Greece.
Apostolopoulos threatened me with being charged as
an accomplice and subjected to length imprisonment.
Facing that charge and the warning that unpleasant
things might happen to my wife and son, I agreed to
sign a document prepared by them. It claimed that
Andreas Papandreou was about to organize a coup
d'etat by a group of dissatisfied young officers,
that he was planning to remove the King, and to take
Greece out of NATO, and that he was in general guilty'
. of pro-communist sympathies and treasonous activities.
Of course, none of the charges were true.
:'00
.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
On the 6th day of September at 6:00 p.m., the
three armed KYP agents took me to the public
.
prosecutor's office, where I gave perjured testimony •• o~
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I left for Paris in August of this year, letting
KYP think I was going Lhere on its behalf to spy on
a conference of Greek democrats in exile. I did not
go back. • ••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••
KYP probably thought they could insure my return to
Greece by forbidding my wife and son to leave Greece
with me ••••

· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . ..
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I was able to have my wife and son secretly picked
up by a chartered airplane and flown to Paris to
join me four days later.
The second

~estimony

is that of Kyriakos

Diakogiannis, who claims that he was also unwillingly
forced by the Greek CIA to fabricate false evidence
against Andreas Papandreou: 65
My involvement in the frame-up of Andreas
Papandreou began in June of 1964, when I wes
introduced to Andreas Vachliotis, an Athens
lawyer and friend of Papandreou. AfLer a series
of long discussions, Mr. Vachliotis and I
a~reed that in Papandreou resided the best
hope for the renaissance of Greek democracy, and
together we drafted, at Papandreou's request a
number of proposed reforms in various areas
of Greek political life • •••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • •

In August, I returned tu Athens, where Vachliotis
introduced me to a KYP agent, Takis Apostolopoulos,
who promptly ushered us into the office of Premier
Stefanopoulos • •••
• • • • • • • •

•

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

After an interrogation and briefing by Takis and
Major Tsakas of KYP, I gave a sworn statement
before a judge of Instruction, recounting the events
exactly as they occurred-with one important difference.
I was also asked to attest that Vachliotis had related
to me a conversation between himself and Papandreou, .
in which the later had purportedly advocated the use.
of violent means to eliminate his opposition. Mr.
Vachliotis had never told me anything of the sort.
In their search for treasonable lI evidence" against
Papandreou, KYP was obliging us to perjure ourselves,
with thinly veiled threats to our persons and those
of our families • •••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

65Kyriakos Diakogiannis, "The Testimony of Kyriakos
Diakogiannis" Ramparts, VI (October, 1967), p. 46.
.

The imaginary conversation to which I attested
went in sUbstance like this:
Papandreou (reading our proposal to replace key·
military and police officials with trustworthy men):
But you haven't said how this should be accomplished.
Vachliotis: Gradually, after careful selection •••
Papendreou (smiling ironically): This kind of
affair only succeeds when the heads begin to roll •••
I was later assured by KYP agents, Takis and others
that my perjured testimony and that of Mr. Vac'.hliotis
were the secret foundation stones of the State's
case against Papandreou, to be sprung on an 66

unsuspecting defense at his impending trial.
As the divison and political struggle between the
King and George Papandreou became public, the whole
country cume close to political anarchy.
Young people (mostly University students)took to
the streets in support of George Papandreou; clashes with
the police occurred almost daily.67
Members of Parliament, enraged over the recent
events, carried the fight into Parliament, which was daily
turned into a wrestling 'ring; it became common and
necessary for the Athens police to intervene whenever
a fight erupted. 68
66Kyriakos D-iakogiannis escaped from Greece on
July 10, 1967.
'
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Strikes by laborers in support of George Papandreou
-also were common.

The nation became so paralyzed by such

strikes that army personnel and police officers were
often called to fill the vacancies created by the striking
workers. 59
Papandreou's popularity was so strong, that the
King found it impossible to successfully establish a
government without him.

It seemed that the only way

that Papandreou could be eliminated from the political
scene was by some non-electoral means.

What this means

was, became evident at 2:30 a.m. the twenty-first of
April 1957.

69 Ibid , p. 97-102.

CHAPTER IV

HOW IT IS NOW
The new Greek Constitution of 1968 has not been
fully implemented.
According to Article 138 of the new Constitution,
all power and authority rests with the junta.

Basic

freedoms, such as free assembly, free elections, and free
speech are postponed indefinitely until the regime deaides
to permit such freedoms.
However, in other sections of the 1968 Constitution,:
the junta has moved towards accomplishing a national
reorganization.
The military dictatorship claims to have achieved
a number of changes in Greece during the last two years.7 0
The regime claims that "it relieved the administrati<m
from the party spirit", but it has not yet brought into
effect Article 123 of the new Constitution, which provides
in part that "public servants are in the service of the
people".71

70Two Years Of Creative Activity, A Greek Government
Publication (Athens: Minstry To the Prlme Minister, Press
and Information Department, 1969), p. 6-21.

?l Ibid •

In the economic sector, the regime claims to
have increased the subsidies for agriculture by about
14.5 billion drachmae,72 for country roads by 2.4 billion
and for housing loans by 1.4 billion, and to have
reorganized the bureaucracies to facilitate economic
development. 73
In its drive

to~ing

about national change in

agriculture, the regime indicates that it is striving
for the following. 74
1. Mechanization of agriculture,
2. Intensive cultivation in place of extensive
cultivation,
3. Profitable yield CUltivation instead of limited
yield cultivation, and
4. National reorganization of agriculture on the
basis of recent scientific developments.
The regime has encountered some active opposition
in its efforts to reorganize agriculture.

This opposition

had resulted in open physical violence, as indicated in
the following by the Associated

Pres~,

r~ported

in

72The drachmae is the basic monetary unit in Greece.
As of April 4, 1970 the official rate of exchange was 30
drachmae to one U.S. dollar.
73frwo Years Of Oreative ActiVit~". A Greek Government
Publica tlon (Athens: Ministry To lJ:heI-ime Minister, Press
and Information Department, 1969), p. 10-11.
74Ibid.

I'.:.f,'
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The Oregonian: 75
A reliable so~rce said fhursday rioting
farmers u;,ing pitchforks battled police in
central Greece, leaving 55 persons inj'ured and
60 under arrest. The rioting broke out
Monday as hundreds of farmers protested
possible government expropriation of land. The
fighting swirled around the village of Megalo
Kalivia in central Greece, the source said.
Farmers wielding pitchforks and sticks
:lashed with police in a two-hour battle. Of
'ose injured, 15 were police.
In the field of social services, the regime has
76
set the following goals:
1. Allocating of two billion drachmae by 1972 for
the development of modern hospitals,
2. Establishment of medical dispensaries, as
well as hygienic er'luipment allover the country, and
3. Granting up to 1. 4 billion drachmae to farmers
for housing, and the erection of 1,700 new houses
for refugees.
In the field of national education, the regime claims
that: 77
1. The promise of free education became a fact
under the regime.
2. Books, manuals, laboratory truining, etc. are
offered free of any charge at"all,
3. The amount of 504 million drachmae were
proclaimed for the construction of school buildings,and
4. Loans will be reimbursed by the students unde~
favourable terms, two years after their gradu~tion.
7511Greek Police Fight Rioters", The Oregonian, April
11, 1969, p. 1.
.

76 Two Years Of Creative Activit.I, A Greek Government
'Publicatl'on (Athens: Ministry To The 'Prime Minister, Press
and Information Department, 1969).p. 11-14.
.

77~, p. 12-15
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Although the above would be impressive, if true,
such measures by themselves would not necessarily
improve the quality of education.

Educators must be

left free to exercise tbeir professional judgements and
responsibilities in their daily classroom duties.

According

, several Greek friends (see footnote number 1), however,
0ducators have been turned into propaganda media for the
,.;ime".

Educators are told what they can and cannot say

in the classroom.

It was indicated, fOJ' example,

that while a teacher was lecturing in the class, he
accidentally used the word "democracy", a forbidden word
in Greece.

Upon bearing this, the police authorities

:)rrested the teacher and subsequently gave him a prison
sentence.
While new classrooms can brighten the educational
sceiln and ease tbe free exchange of ideas, this is not
presently the case in Greece.
become prisons of minds to

Instead, classrooms have

facilit~e

only poisonous

propagand'a to serve the "mastersll.
In its effort to receive tbe support of the labor
class in Greece, the regime apparently aims according
to article 27 of the Constitution, to "ensure employment
for labour and protect them from the point of view of
working and remuneration

in order. to effect
their moral and material elevatiorl,.7 8
condition~

78Ibid , p. 14-15.

,

.

It is not clear how far governmental action has
in fact improved the condition of the workers.

However,

there are no known administrative measures taken by the
government to

implemen~

the above constitutional provison.

Under present economic conditions, it would appear
difficult for the regime to undertake the large public
expenditures required to meet projected goals.

An

indication of the problem is expressed in the following
quotation from Free Greece: 79
Exports last year went up only 12 million
dollars from the 452.6 million dollars earned
in 1967. Tourism receipts dropped for the
second year in a row, from 126.8 million dollars
to 120.3 million dollars. Before the military
take-over, tourism had been growing rapi~ly and
according to fDrecasts, should have earned 156
million dollars last year. With foreign debt
due to rise by 83 million dollars this year
from 428 million on December 31, 1968, it is
estimated that the total national debt will
be 1.88 billion dollars by the end of 1969,
more than five times the country's expected
total assets in gold and foreign currencies.
The regime has made many promises to the people, but
things just do not happen by promises alone.

Besides

resources, a government needs good administrators
with the talent and brains to carry out economic programs.
Because Greece is not a country of abundance, it is
a must that its resources be administered very carefully
7911Greece 1 s Economic Condition", Free Greece, (April,
1969), p. 2.
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and that they be used in the IIrightll place to yield
the best results.
During the early months of the military regime, it
repeatedly sought to acquire the !lbrains ll of Andreas
Papandreou* while he was in prison charged with high
treason. These efforts apparently failed: 80
The Greek military junta has asked Andreas
Papandreou, the political leader whom it has
jailed on charges of high treason, to advise
it on economic matters.,
This overture by Greece's military leaders to the
man they have labeled their archenemy was revealed
Saturday night by Brig. S~ylianos Patakos, minister
of the interior • •••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Patakos visited Papandreou with Ioanis Rodinos
Orlandos, under secretary of' coordination and one
of the officials mainly responsible for directing the
country's economy.
.
Rodinos-Orlandos told papandreou that he considered
him his teacher, and that he had studied his books
on economic development • •••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • •
The minister, backed by Patakos, then urged
Papandreou to state his opinion on the Greek
economy, to comment on the measures taken so far
and to suggest what else should be done. Both
officials told Papandreou that the charges
against him need not prevent him from contributing,
as a Greek, to the country's economic progress.
Papandreou scid that since all he had read about
current events for the past six mon~hs was in the
government- controlled~ess, he was in no position
80If"Greeks Seek Advice from Jailed Leader", The Oregonian,
October 9, 1967, section I. p. 2.

* Andreas Papandreou is an economist of note and for
a number of years was head of the department o£ economics
at the University of California at Berkeley.
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to judge the situation.
Rodinos-Orlandos then urged the prisoner at
least to sum up in one word his impression of how
things were going.
Papandreou said; "Monstrously".
After renewing their appeals for help, the
officials left. A few days later, another official
in the coordination ministry appeared at the prison.
He told Papandreou that the government would send
him any economist or group of economists he might
designate in the economic ministries or the
central bank to provide him with whatever data
statistics he might need. However, Papandreou
reiterated his refusal.
It is very difficult to acquire any further solid
information concerning the economic situation in Greece.
The difficulty stems from the fact that any news concerning
the economy of the country is managed and edited by the
government.

The press can only print what the government

permits; inquiries into the economic affairs of the
country are "disc ouraged" •
Unfortunately, the political and social life of the
Greek people does not appear to be in better health than
the nation's economic life.

The situation is

by terror and intimidation.

The country is ruled by

military

decree.

characteriz~d

People have rights only when

~he

junta

decides to give them on a particular day, hour or minute.
The following cases are presented with the hope
that ttley will give a clear view of what is happening in
81
Greece today. The cases are reported in Free Greece.
81"G r eece Today", Free Greece, (June-July, 1968), p. 3-29.
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Case I. They took my friend X from his house
at nine in the morning. He returned t~o hours
after midnight. ~fuat happened during the 17 hours of
his absence? At the time we knew nothing. Later
his wife persuaded him to talk to me in confidence.
They had shown him a photograph of an election
meeting--there was to have been a general election.
They asked him to identify himself on the photo,
He did. There was no further questioning. They
started beating him up with truncheons, fists,
kicks. 'llhere were five of them. '.L'hey were
hitting him on the head, allover the body.
They were kicking his genitals. They revived
him, made him say "Long live the King", then
'!Long live the revolution II. From time to time
they IIrested". Others were being treated in
the same way. He could see them or hear them
scream. "It was only 17 hours for me" he said,
'because I am oldish and frail, for the young
it was hell".
"
~here was a boy who had been having this for
the fifth day. They would give you as much as
they thought you could take, short of dying. I
think they had orders not to kill.
Case II. At last they let X go with the
warning that if he dared to see a do~tor, if
he dared tell anyone, all this would start
again.
\vhen I saw him two weeks after it ha ppene~d, his
arms were blue on the inside because he had covered
his face with them. His chest, his back, his
legs were blue. . His face 5'wllen and red. His
geniuals swollen, bruised and aching. He could
not breathe or cough freely. He told me th~y
were beating him with fists on tho region of
the heart. They were telling him that they
would "kill his heart". Be had two ribs brOken.
Day after day I he rd of more cases like this.
I saw a boy with a dislocated spine.
The working-class districts were especially hit.
(I can speak only of Athens and Piraeus. I heard
of terrible things in Salonica~ but there I have
no personal knowledge).
Men from 17 up to 70 were selected, mostly from
photographs of political meetings, or sometimes
for things they had said when all this was legal,
when we were free.
The people of the free countries ' ':cused us of
accepting the colonel's coup apathetically. We
were never apathetic. We were struck dumb. We
knew that the whole of the nation's leadership
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had been arrested.
'vJe felt helpless, alone and unarmed, facing
tanks and brutality. The radio was shouting blood
thunder.
Case III. They hit the soles of her feet with
sticks and when her skin cracked they made her
walk on the rocky ground. Then they said they
would kill her. They blindfolded her and, still
ha1f-nak~d, she stood for execution.
They fired
in the air and the girl collapsed. This is called
"moc k execution".
They drove her to the security police station
at Boubou1inas street. They threw her into an
underground cell. Four days without food or
water. She could count the hours by the changing
of the guard. She did not know if it was day or
night. It was cold. There were no blankets. Only
the damp cement floor and crawling little beasts
which horrified her.
On the fourth night she was brought out for
interrogation. The same questions, the same
threats.
They tied her to a bench. One man beat the soles
of her feet, another pulled her hair and banged
her head on the bench, others twisted her arms.
They screamed insults.
One moment they would all be raging, suddenly
someone would be kind. Would she not confess?
She refused. Immediately the "hard" men would
reappear and the beating lrlou1d start again.
Case IV. There was another operation in hbnd,
"Intimidation". Nobody is s(;:cure in his job.
Thousands are fired. Thousands are threatened.
To keep your job you have to sign a certificate
of loyalty. You have to inform on anyone disloyal.
In spite on everything, the young people
started resisting. ~ri~ing ,on the wall,
prin~ing leaflets, and distributing them.
Arrests
are immediate.
Torture now has another purpose. It is aimed
at extracting information.
Case V. I will give the case of a young man of
187'tre-w8s taken by the security police and thrown
into an underground cell. ,There was no light
whatsoever. He could not know whether it was night
or day. TheI'e was nothing but 11e coarse cement
floor.
He was left there for a week without food or
water. A kind policeman furtively brought him
a little yogurt on two occasions.
On the seventh day he was brought out for

interrogation. Who had given him the leaflets?
Who else was involved. Why not answer? He would
have to anyway ••• "after".
They threw him down and tied his legs to a chair.
They started hitting the soles of his feet with
twisted wire, then with thin sackfuls of sand.
His feet swelled and blistered and the skin
cracked. The blood oozed down his legs. At the
same time others were hitting his body, his head.
~hey tore his shirt and started beating him on
the breast. He thinks it was with truncheons.
At the beginning he was screaming, so they put
a dirty rag in his mouth. 'l'hey pressed his
neck. He fainted. He was brought- to with a
bucket of water thrown in his face.
The beating on his feet started again while
another torturen twisted his genitals. He kept
fainting. He would be no man any more, he was
told.
Similar accounts of such tortures, given by
Greeks who escaped from Greece, were published by
Look Magazine in 1969. 82
The regime aims by torture and intimidation to
keep the people quiet through fear.
the m&jor target.

Young people are

Reportedly, hundreds of them go through

the many security police stations just to be beaten and
frightened.
Despite the h0rsh methods use6 by the junta to
silence opposition, opposition has not been crashed.
[l'he Greek people , although terrori2Jed and with their leaders
in jail, have done their best to show their resistance to
the present dictatorship.
820hristopher Wren, IIGreece: Government by Torture",
Look, (May 27, 1969), p. 19-21.

An interesting resistance technique is indicated
in the following account by Par2de: 83
The milit~ry junta of colonels which now
runs Greece hus imprisoned thousands of
political opponents, but the colonels have
not ~et succeeded in silencing the resistance.
The patriotic front or PAM bas found an inf'enious
way of making its cry for freedom heard: T-i 'e
fused tape recordings.
First the PAM worker rents a well si tuate'l
office or a delivery truck. In it he pltm i ; 0
tape-recording anti-junta speech, with sev'
"1
minutes of lead-in silence recorded be~ore
speech begins. He then turns the machine
on and has time to disappear before the machin n
blares out his illegal message • •••

. Underground
. . . . . . newpapers,
. . . . . .which
. . .must
. . be. .printed
......

secretly and often by crude methods in order
to avoid suspicion, are also boomin~ in Greece.
~here are at least ten in operation, with the
most widely read, Nea Rellada (New Greece),
celebrating its 25th issue this month.
It is evident that, despite terroristic methods,
. -Ie junta has not succeeded in breaking the spirit of
the Greek population.
The colonels at first declared that the intention
of "their" revolution was only to eliminate the threat of
a conuunist take-over.

However, they have arrested

or exiled not only left-wingers, but

middle-of-~he

roaders, right-wingers, and anyone else that they consider
a threat to the regime.
83"Greek Resistance", Parade, (February 2, 1969), p. 7.
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At times the

ac~ions

of the regime appear to make
no sense at all, as indicated in the fOllowing: 84
The true nature of the Greek military
dictatorship is revealed in the fatH of
Maj. Gen. George B. KoumanaKos, who gained
international renovm fighting communists in
the field of battle and is now completing his
17th month of imprisonment by the colonels
who claim they have saved Greece from communism.
The KoumanaKos case is another example,
dismally frequent in this gener&tiun, of
Karka come to life. No formal chare;e is
pending, no trial is scheduled, no fixed
limit tl'':lS been pllt on his captivi;~y. Under
lining the Kafk~esoue touch, KoumanaKos had
kept scrupulously free of political connections-
unlike many fellow Greek officers.
Why then is he imprisoned? For precautionery
reasons. Koumanakos, a living legend in the
Korean war as the fearless co~mander of the
Hellenic Expeditionery Forces, is a patriot who
some d8y conceivably might oppose the present
tyrants. Thus, the junta took no chances with
a potential rebel.
Koumanakos is one of many. The distinguished
Adm. Athanasios Spanides, 66, is beginning his
14th consecutive month of detention in a Greek
village. A brigadier, one of the Army's most
daring officers, is in poor health after
sufferin~ head injuries (suppasedly in a diving
accident; while in captivity. A highly respected
retired major general who responded to his recent
early morning arrest by slapping the face of the
arresting officer was beaten bloody by securicy
troops.
But the case of Koumanakos is perhaps the
closest to Kafka because of his valorous and
wholy non-political career.--So circumspect was
he about keeping out of politics that he purposely

8~vans Rowland, and Robert Novak, "Greek Hero

Suffers

Kafaes~Jue

Fate",

Th~

Oregonian. June 27, 1969, p.

,6.
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went abroad in the spring of 1967 to avoid
the national election campaign that was
cancelled by the colonels' COUp of April

27, 1967.

Assuming that he had nothing to fear from
anti-communist fellow officers, Koumanakos returned
to Greece May 17. Seven days later he was arrested
at his home without charge.
It seems that the colonels are determined to
eliminate any Greek, regardless of ideology, who is
capable of leaoArship.

Papadopoulos is determined, it

seems, to brinf' lihe minds and bodies of every Greek man,
woman, and child, to his mercy.

Naturally the easiest

way to accomplish this is by separating the "heads" from
the "oodies".
Despite great pressures against the regime by
other

n~tions

for the return of democratic government

and the basic freedoms to the Greek people, the military
dictatorship has made slight response.

Occasionally

Papadopoulos will make an announcement (when under fire
from other European nations) which seems to carry some
hope that the military tyranny will end, but the hope
always remains unfulfilled.
It is very clear that Papadopoulos, while trying
to give the impression of a "great libertarean ll , is
determined to continue ruling Greece by military
decree.
The calculated use of window-dressing by the
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regime is indicated by the following: 85
Last week, in a move calculated to convince
the world that he and his colleagues really were
civil libertarians after all, Premier George
Papadopoulos announced that three of the
suspended constitutional guarantees- the
inviolability of the home, the rightm
peaceful assembly and the right to form
associations-were being restored immediately.
His first intention, Papadopoulos cheerily
told a press conference, had been to disclose the
new measures on April 21, the second anniversary
of the coup that brought the junta to power. But
on second thought, he explained, he had decided
to make the announcement on the eve of the
Greek Orthodox Baster celebrations. Most
observers, however, agreed that Papadopoulos'
timinG was less influenced by ~aster spirit
than by the NATO meeting under way last week
in Washington. At least four NATO nations-
Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Italy-
had indicated that they would challenge
Greece's fitness for membership in the alliance
at the Washington meeting. And by his partial
restoration of civil rights Papadopoulos clearly
hoped to blunt such criticism.
Whatever happened in Washington, however, the
new measures appeared to be little but window
dressing. Since nine of the constitutional
guarantees remain suspended, individual Greeks still
have no protection against such abuses as
arbitrary arrest.
liThe new measures don't mean a great deal in
practical terms", conceded one American official
familiar with Greek affairs.
In another article by Time, the following
observation was made: 86
(h~ril

85l1Greece:

Window Dressing", Newsweek,

21, 1969), p. 52-55.
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86 11 Why Greece's Colonels Are That Way!!:, Time,
(April 18, 1969), p. 32-33.
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Rather like a stern father rewarding good
behavior, Premier George Papadopoulos last week
returned several previous liberties to the
Gr'eek people. He was observing both the
Easter season and the $econd anniversary of
the coup that ousted the previous government and
brought Papadopoulos and his fellow army colonels
to power. He was also trying to head off
criticism of the Greek regime from the NATO
ministers' meeting in Washington. Announced
the Prime Minister: 1) freedom of assembly
and association will be restored; 2) homes
will be off limits to policemen without warrants;
3) press censorship will be reviewed; 4) some of
the nearly 2,000 political exiles who have been
held on Aegean island.s may be brought home,·
and some government employees ousted by the
regime will get their jobs back. Papadopoulos
seemed not to notice one irony: The press
conference revealing all these freedoms was
held in the now vacant Senate chamber of the
Parliament building in Athens. One freedom
that the birthplace of democracy has not
recovered is a democratic assembly.
Such subtlet~es apparently do not trouble
Papadopoulos and his colonels because they are
elementary men. Or so it seems, for in a complex
world they are trying to forge an anachronistically
simplistic nation. Long hair is now immoral
for schoolboys; the government has ordered hair
cuts, and in some cases police wiellled the shears them
selves. Bouzouki tavernas, where high-spirited
Greeks loved to smash crockery in time with the
frenzied music, have been tamed: guests are no
longer allowed to break even a single saucer.
Miniskirts are forbidden for young girls, and
bar girls are being discouraged. Government
officials must attend church--other Greeks are
urged to do so to build a nation of "Christian
Greeks"--while anyone who publicly doubts God
or the army may be held guilty of blasphemy.
TWese spiritual upliftin~s are hastened, opponents
of the military government say, by torture as well
as exile. "Christians behave themselves because
they are afraid of going to hell", explains
Deputy Prime Minister Stylianos Patakos.
"Likewise, under our regime, Greeks behave
because they are afraid. Only the bad people
are going to be punished".
The military regime of Greece eVidently has

I
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chartered the course which the Greek people must
follow.

It has determined what needs to be done, and

no'dissent by the Greek people is permited.

If anyone

dares to challenge the reasoning of the "wise men"
(Papadopoulos and his lieutenants) , he is , as Deputy
Prime Minister Pattakos says, "punished ll •

For

, persuading the Greek people to accept their physical
and moral liberation, the colonels do not use

,I

rea'son, apparent'ly because they are not reasonable
men.

Instead, they use threats, violence and exile

to implement their-decisions.
No civil body in Greece has power except thot
whicQ is allowed by the military regime.

The Greek

Constitution of 1968 has became the tool for the
mili~ary dicta~orship

terroristic,

to continue its'repressive,

~a~d a~tocratic

rule, while providing

no trme table at'all for a return to democratic and
parliamentary.government in Greece. Article 138
..
87
of, the 1968 Greek Constitution p.rovides that:
The present'C~nstitution, after ~t~ approval
by the Greek Pe,ople through Eeferendum,
. signed by .t·he 'Council of Ministers and published
.in the Gove,rnment Gazette, comes into immediate

I

87Constitution Of Greece 1968, A:Greek Government
Publication (Athens: The Oouncil of Ministers, The Prime '.
. Etnister,The Deputy Prime Ministers, The ·Ministers, 1968),
p.

56'.
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effect, with the except~on of to§ provisions
of Artig1es 10, 12~ 13 § 1, 14 §§ 1-3, 18,
19, 25 §§ 2-3, 58 SS 1-2, 60, 111, 112, 121,
§ 2, which provisions the National Revolutionary
Government is authorized to place into effect
through acts published in the Government Gazette.
The regime, by acquiring the constitutional
power to withhold or to put into effect the provisions
of the constitution has the power to grant or to
withhold: 88
1. The right not to be arrested or imprisoned
without a judicial warrant.
2. The right of a person arrested to be brought
before a magistrate within a reasonable period of
time.
3. The right to be tried by a competent judge
as against that of judicial committees or military
tribunals.
4. The right of home privacy as against
unreasonable searches without legal warrants or
in a manner provided by law.
5. The right of free expression, orally, or
in print.
6. The right to worship asa person's conscience
dictates.
7. The right to establish representative
government, and the establishment of judicial
power.
8. The right to assemble peacefully, and to
form associations.
9. The right to freely establish political
parties and participate in them.
10. The right of free community elections and
or other local government elections for electing
local government leaders.

The 1968 Constitution was created for the sole
~urpose

of perpetuating the dictatorial and police

88 Ibid

-'

p. 7-49.
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powers of the present military dictatorship.
The circumstances under which the Constitution was
prepared and put to referendum, reflected not the
wishes of Greek people, but that of the Colonels.

The

Constitution was formed under martial law and put to
referendum in an atmosphere uf terror and repression.

.'

'II!
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CONCLUSION
From the beginning of his election as premier of
Greece in 1964, George Papandreou was never given the
chance to form his own government.

Immediately

following his election, the King challenged

Papandreou.~,s

authority to appoint and fire members of his cabinet.
It is difficult politically and administratively
to carry out any governmental function if the

Pri~e

Minister is denied the authority to appoint cabinet
ministers of his choosing.

(The 1952 Constitution was

not clear as to the King's powers over the appointments
end dismissals of cabine members).
Political chaos reigned from June, 1964 until the
army coup

d'~tat

of April 21,1967.

The near anarchy

provided the rationale used by the army when it seized
control of the government.
The action of the army came as the country was
preparing for national' elections, which would have
tested the relative strength of the King and the
Prime Minister.
i

As the time for the national elections approached
'(less than one month before the army's GOUp d'etat),
public opinion polls showed that Ge?rge Papandreou
would win the elections with an overwhelming majority.

i

Such a result would have been rightly interpreted as
(

a plebiscite against the King.
As we know, the elections scheduled for 1967 never
took place.

The country has been run by military

decree since the April 21, 1967 coup d'etat.

The

junta has complete power to rule the country as it
wishes, and as long

8S

it wishes.

The whole Greek nation is ruled by the threat
terror, and torture.

bt

The re-education of the Greek

people has been assigned by the head of the military
junta, Papadopoulos, to the police.

The army

~ust

sustain the permanent revolution and, acoording to the
new Constitution, must see to the health of the state
and to the training of the politicians.
By virtue of the powers granded to the military
junta by the 1968 Greek Constitution, the regime has
and is exercising the power of withholding the rights
of free speech, free assembly, free elections, free
press and other basic and

fu~damental

rights.

The

present military regime gives no indication of plans to
return the country to democratic ways.

In fact, all

present signs show that through radical reorganizations
of pri'or democratic instit\ltions, the "junta f1 intends
to implant itself and its ways in Greece permanently.
According to one source,89
89Roy Perrot, "Athens Is Talking About The Junta~s
Permanency", San Francisco Chronicle, August 13, 1969,p. 6.
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One has only to see the new officers' houses
springing up, or read the latest list of promotions
and commissarships in the government gazette, to
se~ how quickly a new administrative class has
been given a vested stay exactly as they are. In
impoverished Greece, a good job is something
to be tenacious about.
Some of the strongest evidence of the colonel's
hopes of permanency, and of the kind of Greece
they are aiming for, is in the schools. A
government which thinks of itself as a trancient
caretaker does not make radical changes in the
educational system, particularly of a kind which
a democratic successor would have to reverse.
In civics lessons, emphasis is laid upon duty to
the State, obedience, the virtue of family life,
all couched in a sort of fundamelist morality.
Teachers told me that modern histories which
deal with cooperative agenCies, like the United
Nations, were rejected in favor of older ones,.
of a more nationalist bent.
I
From the age of nine, children now have to learn
a "correct" and academic form of Greek called
Katharevousa-in addition to the classical and
modern versions of the language. "No wonder
that younger children hardly know the names of
basic things", said one headmaster. "The mental
confusion is painful. We've gone back 50 years".
School children are also obliged to do weekly
essays (set by the Ministry to ensure conformity)
on the philosophy of Prime Minister Papadopoulod's
personal credo. The credo, ~hich leans on
rhetorical Christian apothegms and heroic goals,
is contained in three volumes of speeches and is
about the only literature to see book form in the
last two yeers.
The school curriculum is one of the few clear
indications that exist as to what the prime
minister means when he says that "maturity" is
a prereqUisite of a return to democratic ways.
The reaction of the middle-class parents I met
was precisely what it would be among their
British or American counterparts. They
are distressed at the indoctrination.
It is very likely that if the Western Allies ao
not actively intervene on behalf of the Greek people,
another civil war, similar to the one against the

PORTlAND STATE

m~mERS1TY UBRA~Y

communist terrorist that followed World War II, will
be required before Greek people will be able to
return to a democratic representative government.
Unfortunately, there are no signs to date suggesting
possible allied intervention.
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